```
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 1
                   FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
 2
                           COLUMBIA DIVISION
 3
     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
 4
                                        Docket No. 3:21-cr-00525
             Plaintiff,
 5
 6
                                        Columbia, SC
             VS.
 7
     JEFFREY ALAN BENJAMIN,
 8
             Defendant.
                                        DATE: February 22, 2023
 9
10
                BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARY GEIGER LEWIS
                UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING
11
                             MOTION HEARING
12
     APPEARANCES:
1.3
     For the Plaintiff:
14
     BROOK BOWERS ANDREWS and WINSTON D. HOLLIDAY
15
     U.S. Attorney's Office
     1441 Main Street, Suite 500
16
     Columbia, SC 29201
     803-929-3056
17
     brook.andrews@usdoj.gov
18
     WILLIAM EDWARD SCHURMANN
     Department of Justice
19
     Criminal Division - Fraud Section
     1400 New York Avenue NW
20
     Washington, DC 20001
     202-616-0829
2.1
     william.schurmann2@usdoj.gov
22
23
     COURT REPORTER:
                                    KAREN V. ANDERSEN, RMR, CRR
                                    United States Court Reporter
24
                                     901 Richland Street
                                    Columbia, SC 29201
25
```

```
1
     APPEARANCES:
 2
     For the Defendant:
 3
     WILLIAM MICHAEL SULLIVAN, JR and PATRICK HOVAKIMIAN
     Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP
 4
     1200 Seventeenth Street NW
     Washington, DC 20036
 5
     202-663-8280
     william.sullivan@pillsburylaw.com
 6
     patrick.hovakimian@pillsburylaw.com
7
     ANDREW BURKE MOORMAN
8
     Moorman Law Firm, LLC
     416 East North Street
 9
     Greenville, SC 29601
     864-775-5800
10
     andy@andymoormanlaw.com
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
2.1
22
23
24
25
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

```
THE COURT: Okay. First of all, let me see who all
I've got here today. I see I have Mr. Andrews for the
Government. Where is Ms. Limehouse? Is she coming?
        MR. ANDREWS: She's not here today, Judge.
         THE COURT: Oh, okay. Tell her hello for me.
        MR. ANDREWS: Absolutely.
         THE COURT: For Mr. Benjamin, I have --
         MR. SULLIVAN: Bill Sullivan, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: Bill Sullivan. Okay.
         MR. HOVAKIMIAN: Patrick Hovakimian, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: Okay. I know we have several matters
that we need to get to. I have one matter, I guess, under
advisement that related to the grand jury materials and some
notes of the agent. And I've read the grand jury testimony.
And there is no mention of any deception by Mr. Benjamin or
anything remotely related to that in those grand jury
materials. So unless the agent testifies or some other
reason why the defense would be entitled to that, I don't
think that would be something that needs to happen right now.
         I also looked at the agent's notes. And I will
confess that they are illegible. I mean, I thought that I
had seen over the years with some of my law partners the
worst handwriting ever. But this is unbelievable. Okay?
But we did go through, and where it was possible to figure
out what the agent was writing -- again, there was no -- none
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

```
of the information that you were concerned about being there.
So as far as that motion is concerned, I'm going to deny that
motion. If at some point those materials become something
the Government needs to disclose, I'm sure they will do that.
Is that what you understand?
         MR. ANDREWS:
                      Thank you, Judge. Yes.
         THE COURT: Okay. All right. Very good.
right. Now that leaves for us --
        MR. SULLIVAN: If I might, Your Honor. Thank you
very much for taking the time to review those materials.
         THE COURT: Really, I wish I could show you the
agent's notes, because I want you to believe just how
illegible they are.
         MR. SULLIVAN: I completely believe the Court. I
just want to make sure that my understanding is clear for the
record. So despite the fact that the 302 makes
representations that Mr. Roderick believed Mr. Benjamin lied
or deceived him, which was heavily contested by Mr. Ellerman,
counsel for Mr. Roderick, and disputed by Mr. Roderick's own
declaration, the representations in the grand jury are
consistent with Mr. Roderick's declaration, consistent with
Mr. Ellerman's representations, and inconsistent with the
302.
         THE COURT: Well, what I'm telling you is, all I
know, he may have information from another source that would
```

1.3

2.1

allow him to put that in the 302s. But I'm telling you, in the grand jury testimony and the notes, I did not see anything that related one way or another to that.

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Judge. I appreciate you taking the time again.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Now that leaves, I believe, the defendant's motion that's at Docket 105 to compel *Brady* disclosure. And I have read your materials on that, but I would be happy to listen to anything else you want to tell me.

MR. SULLIVAN: Thanks very much, Your Honor. And I, again, appreciate you taking the time to read our materials, I think we can distill and crystallize the issue as reflected in our reply. All we are looking for here is disclosure of the information that the Government has already determined to be *Brady* in that it is favorable, exculpatory, or material to the defense with regard to the substantive issues, impeachment, sentencing, or punishment.

We believe the Government has already ascertained those documents. And there's nothing in the Fourth Circuit to preclude the disclosure of those documents to the defense. As a matter of fact, in many circuits, it's absolutely mandated. The court in *Skilling* said that the Government must disclose. The court in *Skilling* said the Government cannot hide these types of materials in huge document

1.3

2.1

productions. We have a huge document production. We have 16 million documents.

The Blankenship court, a Fourth Circuit Court, not the Fourth Circuit, but a court in this jurisdiction, a parallel court to your own court, has mandated that the Government scrutinize its materials and disclose. And that court even went so far as to say the Government is in the best position to decide what's exculpatory while they concurrently include material to decide which is inculpatory as they build their case.

So we believe there's nothing precluding you from simply saying to the Government, whatever you found that's Brady, give it to them. It would be economical. It would be efficient. And it would be consistent with the rules outlined in Brady and the Justice Department manuals.

Now, the Government has cited Yi and Sotomayor.

Those cases are inapposite. Yi is a post-conviction case whereby the Court declined the relief sought by the defendant, who was asking for post-conviction de novo review of the Government's materials in a search for Brady. We are not asking for that here.

And in *Sotomayor*, even though the remedy was denied, the relief was denied there, that's a very different case.

That case featured less than 10 percent of the documents issued here, Your Honor. But also, in *Sotomayor*, there was

2.1

an index. There was particularized documents. There were catalogs of materials. There was an avenue and an opportunity for the defendant to search. We don't have that. We have 16 million documents. We don't have an index. We don't have particularized catalogs. We don't have delineations of categories of documents, nor do we have metadata. We have no metadata for the materials we've obtained for the Government relating to Fluor, which, as you know, is a subcontractor here which was obligated to build the project and which got involved in serious contentions or consciousness between WEC and Fluor in terms of progress, rebaselining and scheduling.

You've seen our motion to dismiss. We've outlined our theories of defense and how separate Mr. Benjamin is from what went on at SCANA with regard to representations made to investors, bondholders, and rateholders, which implicates our venue motion, which will come next.

Those cases demonstrate that what we are asking for is well-documented, well-established throughout the country. There's an obligation to provide *Brady*. There's an obligation to search for *Brady*. And that we believe was done here. But there is a further --

THE COURT: When you say an obligation to search for Brady, so, basically, you are saying that of these 16 million documents, you want the Government to go through all 16

```
million documents and tell you the documents they think might
 1
 2
    be helpful to Mr. Benjamin?
              MR. SULLIVAN: That's not what we are asking.
 3
              THE COURT: I hope not.
 4
                            What we are asking, as outlined in
 5
              MR. SULLIVAN:
     Skilling and Blankenship, is that the United States should
 6
 7
     specifically designate those documents that is already --
              THE COURT: Already aware of.
 8
              MR. SULLIVAN: -- already aware of to be Brady in
 9
     light of the definitions of Brady I just gave. And I would
10
     also further refine that by saying, I think the Court would
11
     agree with me the case law does distinguish between
12
    disclosure and production.
1.3
              THE COURT: Yes.
14
              MR. SULLIVAN: Many of the cases outline how
15
     Skilling in particular, and I just quoted that, a production
16
    which includes Brady embedded like the needle in the hay
17
     stack of 4 to 5 to 10 million documents and we had 16 --
18
              THE COURT: Look, I used to be a plaintiff's lawyer.
19
20
     I'm very familiar with the giant dump of documents in which
     you are supposed to find something.
2.1
              MR. SULLIVAN: That's good to hear. And I
22
     appreciate that, Your Honor. That's all we are looking for,
23
    disclosure of known Brady material. And as we've
24
     demonstrated in our record, we believe known Brady material
25
```

1.3

2.1

exists, has been found by the Government, is in their possession, and as I said earlier, would represent no burden, no hardship, no prejudice, to simply let the defense know.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right.

Mr. Andrews, that sounds reasonable. If you already know and you've identified *Brady* material, why wouldn't you disclose that?

MR. ANDREWS: Well, so, Judge, I think -- and I just had this conversation with Mr. Sullivan. But there seems to be signals crossed on what the Government's position is on identifying Brady material. We have always told the defense, look, we get it, it's a large volume of discovery. We have been over-inclusive in our approach to discovery. And it's not to frustrate the defendant, but, in fact, to give them an ample case and to make sure that we are being overly careful in our approach to disclosure. As we have done that, we have also indicated to the defendant everything that this case is about.

There is a speaking indictment in this case with 63 paragraphs of factual arguments supporting our theory of the case. Before we ever charged Mr. Benjamin, we gave them a reverse proffer in which we walked through hundreds of slides in a PowerPoint deck making exactly clear upon what documents and what testimony our case in chief was going to be based.

Now, we have not, in the course of our four years of

1.3

2.1

investigation in this case, found specific documents that we believe to be exculpatory of Mr. Benjamin. Now, is there information in the discovery that the defendants may find to be favorable to their case? I'm sure that there is. And I have no doubt that with their team of attorneys, they will find those documents and put them together in a manner that they can present to the jury. And that's exactly their job. And it's exactly not our job.

I understand the representation he's making. I think they've distilled their case down to something perhaps less than we understood it to be when it started. I think they understand that the law does not compel the Government to go through all of those pages of discovery and identify for them the exculpatory information. All of that information has been disclosed. It is word searchable.

With respect to the Fluor production, I understand they've sought a third-party subpoena for those documents.

We have as well. There should be metadata in that production. I think that issue should be cured. That's the only notice that I'm aware of that they don't have what they need to adequately mine the information we have produced in this case to build a defense for their client.

Look, Judge, if we were going to talk about specific documents and evidence, we are very aware of our obligations under *Brady*. And we are happy to have that conversation.

1.3

2.1

But we have no time represented to them that we have a box marked *Brady* material in the office that we are hiding from them or otherwise not identified and we are hoping that they don't find in the discovery.

THE COURT: We did get a box of documents one time for a big defense firm that said, "Do not produce." And the case resolved shortly thereafter.

MR. ANDREWS: I'm sure it did.

THE COURT: It does happen.

MR. ANDREWS: We don't have that box, Judge. We have given them everything we have, which is not an approach that we are obligated to take. I would say, we've given them things that are not Rule 16, that are not Brady, Giglio or Jencks, but, nevertheless, they were received by us in the course of the grand jury investigation. And we are handing that over anyway. And, again, that's not to overburden the defendants, who do have the resources at their disposal to review those documents and mine them and word search them on the platforms they use for document review. But it's rather to make sure that we are being overly careful. This is a complex case. We understand that. There's a lot of different potential avenues out there for the defense to take. But we have not frustrated them in any way.

If anything like that arises where we find documents that we really believe are exculpatory, we don't have any

objection to identifying them. We do contest --1 2 THE COURT: Well, I think that in the course of your preparation, if you do identify documents that are 3 exculpatory, then that's when you do need to disclose those 4 to the defendant. 5 MR. ANDREWS: That's right. And just so we are 6 7 clear about disclosure, I think what we are talking about identification, because the documents have already been 8 given. THE COURT: Everything's been disclosed. 10 MR. ANDREWS: That's right, it's been disclosed, 11 it's been provided. And we throw around the word Brady a 12 lot, but an element of Brady is suppression. It necessarily 1.3 involves the withholding and the suppression of evidence. 14 And just to be clear, when Skilling articulated the 15 rule here, it said expressly not that Brady obligates the 16 specific identification of exculpatory information. That is 17 the general rule that the court articulated in that case. 18 Ιt is in our brief. 19 20 So, Judge, look, we will continue to honor and uphold our discovery obligations in this case. 2.1 THE COURT: So what you are telling me is that you 22 haven't found anything that you truly believe to be 23 exculpatory? So you haven't identified anything to the 24 defendants? 25

```
MR. ANDREWS: We have disclosed everything and not
 1
     identified anything.
 2
              THE COURT: Okay. All right.
 3
              MR. ANDREWS:
                            That's correct.
 4
              THE COURT: And what is your position about going
 5
     forward? If you are continuing, during your preparation for
 6
    the trial, you determine that something is exculpatory, is it
 7
     your intention to identify that to the defendant?
 8
              MR. ANDREWS:
                            Judge, it would continue to be our
     assertion that that is not legally obligated. But we will
10
    have those conversations. If we see anything that is
11
     alarming to us in the way that it stands out as
12
    exculpatory -- here's the trap that I think we get into.
1.3
     There is obviously subjectivity here about what the
14
    defendants -- their defenses are going to be. And we can't
15
    anticipate all of those. There are certainly going to be
16
     documents --
17
              THE COURT: There is an element of good faith here.
18
              MR. ANDREWS:
                            That's right.
19
20
              THE COURT: When you are going through those
     documents, if you've at least thought, hmmm, this might be a
2.1
    problem for us --
22
              MR. ANDREWS: Judge, let me identify a specific
23
    example. The defendants are well aware that we've had three
24
     individuals from the V.C. Summer nuclear plant who have pled
25
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

```
quilty to felony offenses in this case. Right? Everybody
knows that. Kevin Marsh, Steve Byrne, and Carl Churchman
have pled guilty to felonies. Their plea agreements, Mr.
Marsh's sentencing proceeding, all of that is public.
defendants have it. Their 302s, their memorandum where they
have conceded crimes, where they have conceded fault, all of
that has been disclosed to the defendant. Obviously, you
know, those folks may all be, or some of them, on our witness
list at trial. That is all available Giglio impeachment
evidence. They know that. And they are welcome to use it.
We don't have any opposition to that. And we've had
conversations with them about those particular witnesses as
well.
         Now, for the other, you know, 16 million pages of
documents that are out there, you know, we don't want to get
into a game of going through and saying --
         THE COURT: Well, I am not asking you to go through.
I'm saying in the course of going through the documents for
purposes of preparing your case -- not asking you to go
through and locate exculpatory information out of 16 million
documents. But in the course of preparing your case, if you
do, in the course of that, discover something that you feel
is potentially exculpatory, what is your intention about
disclosing that?
                      If we find something that is
         MR. ANDREWS:
```

```
potentially exculpatory, then we will have a conversation
 1
     with them about that.
 2
              THE COURT: Okay. So you say you will have a
 3
     conversation about that. I don't know what that means.
 4
              MR. ANDREWS: We will inform them of that particular
 5
     document.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: Okay. All right.
              MR. ANDREWS: But I want to be clear, though, that
 8
    we do not intend to go through --
 9
              THE COURT: And I don't expect you to.
10
              MR. ANDREWS: -- the rest and identify.
11
              MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, you have acutely hit it
12
     on the head right now, right then. Just before you said,
1.3
    might be a problem. That is a good way to identify our
14
    perception of what Brady is in terms of favorability,
15
    exculpatory nature, material to the defense. In
16
     conversations with the Government, which we have outlined in
17
    our motion, we have learned that: A, this case was too big
18
    to do a Brady review; B, yes, we found stuff that are
19
     inconsistent with our prosecution theory. Yes, we found
20
     stuff that we will have to deal with at trial.
2.1
     dovetails precisely with your delineation of "might be a
22
    problem."
23
              And yet, today, they refused to admit that they have
24
     such material after telling us that they do, which is totally
25
```

2.1

consistent with what you said in terms of describing such material. So I posit that they have such material. They are obligated to produce it today or in short form, because it has been located, consistent with your delineation of what Brady means. And we agree with your assessment.

THE COURT: All right. Well, Mr. Sullivan, what you are suggesting is that Mr. Andrews has information that he thinks is exculpatory, particularly he can identify documents that are exculpatory, and he's not giving those to you. I don't accept that. I accept what the Government says, that they understand what their obligations are under *Brady*. They know what they are supposed to do with documents that they have identified as exculpatory to date. They say none.

If in the course of preparing their case and continuing to review these documents, as you will be doing as well, if they come across something that they think is exculpatory, they are going to have to turn it over. And they tell me that they will. So I don't see what the problem is here then.

MR. SULLIVAN: My only concern, Your Honor, is that their view of *Brady* is extremely limited and not consistent with yours or mine.

THE COURT: And they probably aren't. But there's no way for us to change that, really. I mean, we have to rely on their good faith. They know what's a problem for

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

```
their case. And I believe that all the lawyers here are
acting in good faith, and that if Mr. Andrews does come
across something that he knows he's going to really have to
deal with, he will identify that document for you.
        MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: All right.
         MR. HOLLIDAY: Your Honor, if we could, I have to
take a half a step back. At the very end of your discussion
regarding the grand jury material and Agent Hawkins notes and
all that stuff, Mr. Sullivan opined that does that mean, Your
Honor, that you are accepting the Ellerman/Roderick version
of how the interview took place?
         THE COURT: No, I am not. That's not my job to do
that. I looked at those materials to see if, in fact, there
was testimony that Mr. Sullivan suspected was there, and it
was not.
        MR. HOLLIDAY: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
appreciate it.
         THE COURT: All right. Okay. I think that
leaves -- I'm sorry, Mr. Sullivan, something else you wanted
to say?
         MR. SULLIVAN: No, I was just leading on to the next
motion.
         THE COURT: All right. The venue issue. All right,
Mr. Sullivan.
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

25

MR. SULLIVAN: As we outlined in our papers in terms of what the exchange of pleadings has been on this issue, I think it's fair to say that the Government, if not outright conceding, understands our position with regard to the ratepayer, bondholder, investor issue with regard to the population of Columbia, which would be jury area B. Sixty-five percent of those individuals were ratepayers. are concerned that the Government has styled this case as a case whereby SCANA representatives and Mr. Benjamin have conspired to defraud these individuals, compelling them to pay excess rates for their utilities because of that fraud. Obviously, we contest that. We don't believe the Government has shown or can show a conspiracy between SCANA and Mr. Benjamin, SCANA and Westinghouse, Mr. Benjamin and anyone at Westinghouse. But, nevertheless, those are the allegations, Your Honor. We are concerned that individuals who are going to be listening every day to how they were victimized, despite a robust defense, which I believe that the defense team will provide, are going to be inherently prejudiced in terms of rendering a fair and objective opinion on the facts in this

case. We have 90 percent of the individuals in the Greenville pool not having an affiliation with Columbia -I'm sorry, with Dominion or SCANA as a result of the merger.
They are folks who get their electricity from Duke. So we

2.1

think it makes perfect sense to use a Greenville jury pool.

However, there is a dispute, as I understand it, as to how to get those jurors. We don't think that it makes sense to separate the jurors from the trial site. One, they are going to be compelled to either travel two hours each way four hours a day, or they are going to be compelled to be sequestered, which is a gross and very difficult inconvenience for a jury, for jury members.

Secondly, we think that the pool of available jurors are not going to represent a cross-section of -- a fair cross-section of the community for Mr. Benjamin, because a lot of those people will be eliminated simply by virtue of the sequestering or the travel. As we've outlined, we are going to have individuals who have young children, K through 12. We are going to have individuals who need to care for sick or needy family members that can't be accommodated at night, even if they sit at a jury during the day. And we also have people with medical infirmities that won't be able to sustain a two-hour ride in the car, circulatory problems, et cetera. So we are going to be unfairly limiting the very jury pool that we think is the best jury pool for Mr. Benjamin in light of the ratepayer issue. So it simply makes no sense.

We believe that to provide due process for Mr.

Benjamin in a fair and impartial setting, we need jurors who

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

25

are not affiliated with the utilities at issue here. And we need jurors who can pay attention to the case, won't otherwise be distracted, and most importantly, a pool that's not limited by virtue of the individuals who won't be able to be seated because of a medical or personal inconvenience. we submit that we simply try the case in Greenville. Farkas factors do not implicate that in any way, shape, or form. They are basically neutral. There's nothing in those factors that mandates that for any particularized interest noted there, the case has to be tried in Columbia. So that is our position, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Andrews. MR. ANDREWS: Judge, we would agree with the defense that the factors do not support a venue transfer when you are looking at the convenience to the parties, when you are looking at the conveniences to the witnesses. It's going to be the same whether it's here or in Greenville. THE COURT: I realize there's going to be some inconvenience. My biggest concern is the jurors. MR. ANDREWS: So I want to talk about that. in the defendant's motion, most of the press clippings that they cite to are anger at SCANA and its executives. We have a different case here. Jeff Benjamin was the vice president

of Westinghouse. He worked in Pennsylvania. He now lives in

Colorado. 1 THE COURT: Are you now arguing that you don't want 2 the jury pool to come from the upstate? You want it to be 3 here? 4 MR. ANDREWS: Let me make it clear. 5 THE COURT: I thought you had basically said you 6 7 didn't oppose drawing the jury from up --MR. ANDREWS: That's our fallback position, Judge. 8 Our first position is, we can do this trial here in Columbia with a Columbia jury pool, and that the rules -- the factors 10 that support Rule 18 and Rule 21, the constitutional 11 limitations, none of those are supported here. And the 12 primary reason is, this is not the same case, necessarily, as 1.3 the SCANA case. Yes, it involves VC Summer. But it's a 14 different party. And there are different players involved in 15 the fraud that occurred here. The \$100 million a month that 16 Jeff Benjamin has been charged with defrauding from the 17 owners --18 THE COURT: Let's just assume that I don't agree 19 20 with you about the first part. All right. I believe I saw in your papers that if we did select a jury from the upstate 2.1 pool, you still thought that we should bring the jurors here 22 and have the trial here in Columbia. 23 MR. ANDREWS: That's correct. 24 25 THE COURT: Why?

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

25

MR. ANDREWS: Well, Judge, we don't think there's any justification to move all of the resources of the Court and, you know, our prosecuting entity up to Greenville for weeks on end. THE COURT: It's a really nice courthouse. MR. ANDREWS: It's a beautiful courthouse. There's no --THE COURT: It's empty. We would have the whole courthouse to ourselves. MR. ANDREWS: I was there for the unveiling. amazing. I have no grievances with the Greenville courthouse. But, Your Honor, our first position is this -and, honestly, the fallback is us candidly trying to be reasonable and find some way to find a middle ground on just yet another issue that's been put before the Court. Our primary position is that this is a case that can be tried in Columbia, that a number of years have passed, that there's no public furor against Jeff Benjamin. People here in Columbia don't know who Jeff Benjamin is. And to the extent that they know this story, they think about SCANA, they think about SCE&G. They are not thinking about Westinghouse. We can through voir dire and through jury selection, absolutely weed out people who have -- who cannot be fair and impartial or people who have

personal relationships to any of the entities that were on

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

25

site in Jenkinsville. And that is the proper procedural mechanism to pick a fair and impartial jury. We can do that here in Columbia. Now, it has been our fallback position. If the Court is inclined in some way to not pick a Columbia jury pool, then it is at least theoretically possible for us to pick a Greenville jury pool and still try the case in Columbia. That is our position, Judge. THE COURT: Okay. What about the inconvenience to the jurors? I mean, obviously, I would prefer for it to be here. Certainly, it would be easier for me and it would be easier for you. For everybody else, it wouldn't be easier. So -- and I'm willing to travel to Greenville and stay in Greenville for three weeks, or whatever I need to do, instead of asking the jurors to do that. MR. ANDREWS: Well, Judge --THE COURT: I'm sure that -- I mean, y'all have your offices all over the state. To me -- and the witnesses are kind of a neutral issue. I mean, people are going to be flying in and traveling from somewhere depending on where in the trial their testimony might be needed. I don't see that being a huge factor. I'm concerned about the jury. MR. ANDREWS: Judge, look, I am not going to represent here that there would be no imposition on the jury.

There would be. And, honestly, the issue with the

1.3

2.1

convenience to the parties and the witnesses, that's why I come back to question one, which is, do we need to draw a Greenville jury pool at all? And I think we don't. That is our first position in this case. I am not going to disagree with you that it would be inconvenient for the jurors. And we know that it's a service -- already a difficult service to be picked for a three-week jury pool.

THE COURT: And you know this, of course, applies to me too, even though they could stay in a hotel here, they can't stay over the weekend. So they all got to travel on Friday, probably on Sunday to get back here in time to start the trial. It just -- I would just put them up in a hotel. That doesn't sound so bad. But it really is much more disruptive than letting them sit in the Greenville and just spend the days with us.

So, all right, Mr. Sullivan.

MR. SULLIVAN: I think you've articulated everything I might have said a few minutes ago. We think the victimhood of the jurors is a per se disqualifier. The convenience of the jury is paramount here. We wouldn't have a cross-sectional pool. And, frankly, I didn't even mention, there is much more adverse press in this area, much more press saturated in this area than up in Greenville. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I think what I'm going to do

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

```
on this is, I'm going to grant the motion, even though I'm
pretty confident that we could, with enough time and effort,
draw a jury from this section of the state and give Mr.
Benjamin an impartial jury, I think the safer and surer way
to do that is to draw the jury from the upstate.
                                                 So that's
what I think we are going to do on that.
         Now, the next is, you know, it's going to be an
inconvenience to the lawyers here in Columbia that are the
lead on the case. It's going to be an inconvenience to me.
But having the case tried actually in Greenville, I think
will help us as far as the jury's participation concerns.
mean, if we do it here, I can see with COVID, excuses, people
are getting tired after a week or so of being out of town,
the next thing I know, I have COVID exposures and, you know,
who knows what could happen. So even if we, you know, maybe
draw four alternates or even more, we could still run into
problems. So I think I'm going to grant the motion. We will
draw the jury from the upstate pool. And we will have the
trial in Greenville. Okay.
         MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
                      Thank you, Judge.
         MR. ANDREWS:
         THE COURT: All right. Anything further on any of
this? All right. Do we want to maybe schedule a pretrial
conference or something in advance of that?
         THE COURT DEPUTY: There's already one scheduled.
```

THE COURT: When is that? 1 THE COURT DEPUTY: In September. 2 MR. ANDREWS: Judge, I have two other housekeeping 3 matters, if I could. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. ANDREWS: We mentioned this in our most recent 6 7 motion, but a superseding indictment is imminent. I will say that it is some wordsmithing. It is not substantive. 8 have not added counts. We have not materially changed counts. But there are some differences here and there we 10 thought were appropriate. And that should be available to 11 the defendant and to the Court we think very soon. So I just 12 want to mention that. It will, I believe, affect their 1.3 pending motion to dismiss. Of course, they can look at the 14 superseding indictment and decide whether they want to 15 proceed with the motion, amend the motion. I suppose that's 16 entirely within their discretion. But I did want to raise 17 that for the Court, that that is happening. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. ANDREWS: The other two issues, if I could 20 briefly in regards to scheduling, you will recall at the last 2.1 pretrial, we had really insisted upon the May trial date. 22 feel like this case is ready to try. It has now been 23 continued to October. We really want to be able to lock in a 2.4 date, a date certain for the trial. We have a lot of 25

```
witnesses coming from a lot of places around the country.
 1
     The calendar indicates that we are drawing a jury on
 2
    Wednesday, October 4th. We are flexible as to what that
 3
     first day of trial is, whether it's the date to follow or the
 4
     following Tuesday after the holiday.
 5
              I spoke with Bill Sullivan briefly about this a
 6
 7
    moment ago. It seems like we are on the same page in terms
    of it being appropriate for the Court to set a date certain
 8
     so we can start getting in motion --
              THE COURT: I'm happy to do that because there's so
10
    many witnesses that are going to be traveling. It's just --
11
    could be a mess.
12
              THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Jury selection date may
13
     change transferring it to Greenville.
14
              THE COURT: I think I asked Kathy to check with Fred
15
    on that.
16
              THE COURT DEPUTY: Fred doesn't control that, if you
17
     can still have jury selection on October 4th.
18
              THE COURT: Because he thought that wasn't going to
19
20
    be a problem, but maybe we can just confirm that.
              THE COURT DEPUTY: I will take care of that when
2.1
    this hearing is over.
22
              THE COURT: Of course, we have administrative issues
23
24
     that, since we are moving the case to Greenville, my
     intention was to keep the same jury selection date, just do
25
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

25

it in Greenville. And we had some preliminary discussions with the folks up there. And I'm fairly confident that we can do that. But I'm informed that the coordinator up there isn't in the loop yet. And so we've got to verify that. this might change. But let's just proceed as if I'm going to be able to have the jury selection on October 4th. that's a Wednesday or a Thursday? MR. ANDREWS: That's a Wednesday, Your Honor. THE COURT: Wednesday in Greenville. MR. ANDREWS: Judge, we would not be opposed if the Court -- whether it's on the 4th or not, if in the next scheduling order, the Court wants to enter not just a date for jury selection, but for actually beginning of the trial proceedings, we would defer to the Court's judgment on that, but we would welcome that, because it would give us some certainty for planning. THE COURT: Let me ask you what your general preference would be. If we have a jury selection on, say, a Wednesday or a Thursday, and it may be October 4th, would you -- the parties' preference, would it be to begin the trial immediately, the morning after, or that following Monday or Tuesday, depending on whether it's a holiday? MR. ANDREWS: Your Honor, that is a federal holiday, that following Monday. And so it would be a long weekend. We would be fine just to start the following Tuesday after

```
jury selection.
 1
 2
              THE COURT DEPUTY: That would be the 10th.
              MR. SULLIVAN: No objection here, Your Honor.
 3
              THE COURT DEPUTY: October 10th.
 4
              THE COURT: October 10th?
 5
              MR. ANDREWS:
                            That's correct.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: All right. Then let's tentatively have
     the jury selection on the 4th and we will start on the 10th.
 8
     If I have a problem with the folks in Greenville, I will get
     that nailed down today. And I will enter an order that sets
10
    all that out. Okay?
11
              MR. ANDREWS: Judge, just one other scheduling
12
     issue, Judge. We now have -- if I'm counting correctly,
1.3
    we've resolved three pretrial motions. There's another
14
              There will inevitably be motions in limine
15
    pending.
     immediately before trial. It would be helpful for the
16
     Government for the Court to impose some kind of motions
17
    deadline, perhaps in May, so that if we are going to see any
18
     other motions with regard to dismissing the indictment or for
19
    discovery or anything else, that we just get those out there
20
     so that we can be resolving those and not stepping on the
2.1
     toes of motions in limine, motions for evidence, and other
22
     things like that before trial.
23
              MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, Your Honor. I've had
24
    preliminary discussions with Mr. Holliday about doing
25
```

```
precisely that. We are amenable to that. Only caveat would
 1
 2
    be to the extent that evidentiary issues pop up as we
    continue to investigate the case, we are going to have to
 3
    make those motions as we learn about the reasons therefore.
 4
    So motions in limine, we won't be able to specifically
 5
     schedule. But we can set a generalized motion schedule we
 6
 7
    can adhere to --
              THE COURT: Why don't you all put something together
 8
     that you agree to and then submit it to me and I will enter
     it.
10
              MR. ANDREWS: We can do that, Judge.
11
              MR. SULLIVAN: My only other thought was, in light
12
    of the Greenville move, we would have difficulties if
1.3
    Greenville cannot accommodate us on October 4 or later. If
14
    Greenville is going to try to suggest an earlier date, in
15
     light of some of the things we need to do, that would be more
16
    difficult. So I would anticipate that we will hold October
17
     4, or if necessary, maybe a bit beyond it. But if Greenville
18
     only has dates in September or August, we can't accommodate
19
     that, unfortunately, Your Honor.
20
              THE COURT: Well, we won't do it. It's going to be
2.1
    October.
22
23
              MR. SULLIVAN: All right. Great. Thank you so
    much.
24
              THE COURT: All right. Anything further?
25
```

```
MR. ANDREWS: Nothing further.
 1
               MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you for your time, Your Honor.
 2
               (Whereupon, proceedings are adjourned.)
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

## CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Karen V. Andersen, Registered Merit Reporter,

Certified Realtime Reporter for the State of South Carolina

at Large, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript is

a true, accurate and complete Transcript of Record of the

proceedings.

I further certify that I am neither related to nor counsel for any party to the cause pending or interested in the events thereof.

Karey V. Andersen

Registered Merit Reporter Certified Realtime Reporter